



or a Continent Apart?**
1. Introduction
On May 21, 1986, the United States commenced historic bilateral trade
negotiations with Canada which, if implemented, will impact substantially
upon North American multilateral trade relations and the nature of North
American manufacturing. This article attempts to highlight areas of dif-
ficulty in the Canada-United States negotiations that could create major
obstacles to their successful completion in a free trade agreement. In so
doing, it considers the historical underpinnings of Canada-United States
relations, the unique form of existing trade between the two countries
and, finally, the results that the negotiations could achieve.
Both Canada and the United States are experiencing severe domestic
and international economic challenges. In an international setting of de-
clining economic sovereignty and increased interdependence between na-
tions, concern over economic vulnerability has come to the forefront in
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Canada and the United States. Both countries are experiencing difficulties
competing with less-developed nations that have lower labor and resource
costs coupled with increasing competitive efficiency. The United States,
despite being the world's largest trading nation, is experiencing a severe
imbalance between its imports and its exports. This imbalance is fueling
the resurgence of trade protectionism. Canada, while not experiencing a
trade deficit, has a national deficit that is substantially larger per capita
than that of the United States. Its reliance upon the United States as a
marketplace for exports is much more dramatic than that of the United
States upon it, creating a greater level of economic dependence by Canada
on the United States.
The two countries are each other's largest trading partner and key
source of investment in each other's economy. In 1986, 24.5% of the
United States' world exports are to Canada, with a comparative per-
centage of its imports originating there.I This is more than two times the
value of the United States' trade with Japan. In fact, the United States'
two-way trade with Canada is greater than its trade with all ten members
of the European Economic Community. In 1986, approximately 80% of
Canada's exports were to the United States' marketplace and approxi-
mately 69% of its imports came from the United States. 2 Two million
jobs in each country depend on the two-way trade between the United
States and Canada.
The importance of American imports from Canada is reflected by their
intrinsic nature and by actual percentages. Canada is the largest foreign
supplier of energy to the United States, providing 100% of American
natural gas and electricity imports. Canada is the largest supplier of ura-
nium and the second largest supplier of oil to the United States. Nearly
85% of American exports to Canada are manufactured or semifinished
products that are more labor-intensive than resource exports, thereby
creating jobs for Americans through Canadian imports. Comparable fig-
ures for Japan and the European Economic Community were 25% and
64% respectively. 3 American imports from Canada, other than those in
the automotive sector, tend to be raw materials and semifinished products,
all of which are incorporated and refined into finished products by Amer-
ican workers. Canadian imports, in general, are not a threat to the Amer-
ican worker.
Economic interdependence, coupled with a close binational affinity be-
tween the two countries and their individual populations, has created a
I. United States Department of Commerce.
2. STATISTICS CANADA (1986).
3. Address by Ambassador Allan Gotlieb, Canadian Ambassador to the United States,
Detroit, Michigan (Sept. 27, 1985).
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spill-over effect whereby the domestic policies of one country often affect
and are affected by the foreign and commercial policies of the other. The
strength of the economic interdependence of the two nations, combined
with an economic spill-over effect to the other country, is more pro-
nounced in Canada because of its smaller population and lesser economic
strength.
A bilateral trade enhancement agreement will increase the interaction
of the domestic and foreign policies of the two countries. Because of the
significant dependence of Canada upon the United States, its government
is increasingly concerned with and affected by American trade laws and
regulations.
A Canada-United States trade agreement would regulate and, ideally,
eliminate economic barriers between the two nations including tariffs,
economic irritants, and other nontariff barriers (laws or regulations that
explicitly or indirectly impose discriminatory burdens on goods of foreign
origin, such as government procurement practices, labeling requirements,
and quality standards).
A significant aspect of the negotiations is the inequality of the two
nations in their respective market size and ultimate economic strength.
An open market between the two nations without other concessions from
Canada would not be acceptable to Congress as Canada would effectively
gain access to a market ten times the size of its own and the United States
to one only a tenth the size of its domestic market. In exchange for opening
the American market to Canada, Congress wants other concessions from
the Canadians. The issue of whether secure access to the marketplace in
the United States at the federal level is a fair exchange for secure access
in Canada at both the federal and provincial levels has come under close
scrutiny by Congress. In addition to access to the provincial marketplace,
Congress has demanded other concessions from Canada relating to other
economic irritants such as American access to the Canadian investment
markets and communication industries.
11. History Of Canada-United States Trade Relations4
In the years following the American Revolution up to and including the
War of 1812, a number of American leaders were interested in the ex-
pansion of the United States northward. 5 Despite the "hostile" overtures
4. For a comprehensive overview see Dr. Earl H. Fry, An Historical Overview of Canada-
United States Trade Relations, Paper presented at The Trade Liberalization and Socio-
Economic Integration in North America Conference, Association Quebecoise des Etudes
Americaines, Montreal, Quebec (October 30-31, 1986).
5. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 29-53 (R. Devine ed. 1960).
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of the War of 1812, the United States' initial attempts to convince the
then Canadian colonies to join their new country were friendly.
Canada acceding to this confederation, and joining the measures of the United
States, shall be admitted into and be entitled to all advantages of this union;
but no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be
agreed to by nine states.
6
When England terminated preferential trading arrangements with its
colonies in 1846, Canada looked to the United States as a substitute
market. After lengthy negotiations, Canada (which was still a colony of
England) and the United States entered into the Elgin-Marcy Reciprocity
Treaty of 1854, which provided for free trade in natural products including,
inter alia, timber, fish, butter, coal, and grain. American relations with
Canada became strained over high Canadian tariffs on manufactured prod-
ucts, and the treaty was terminated unilaterally by the United States in
1866. 7
During the next decade Canada attempted unsuccessfully to interest
the American leaders in another trade pact, having become reliant on the
proportionately larger American market and having changed its currency
from pounds to dollars. In 1874 a draft treaty was negotiated that included
the natural products of the earlier one and, in addition, agricultural im-
plements, steel, paper, furniture, footwear, and a number of other man-
ufactured products. The United States Senate refused to ratify it.
In 1911 the Canadian Government, under the leadership of Sir Wilfred
Laurier, negotiated another trade agreement with the United States. That
agreement was to have been implemented by way of concurrent legisla-
tion. The Canadian federal election in 1911 centered on the proposed
agreement and the advisability of entering into closer economic relations
with the United States. The Conservative opposition defeated the Laurier
government on this issue, using the campaign slogan "No Truck or Trade
with the Yankees."
The next major development occurred in 1941 when a bilateral sectoral
agreement was entered into through the Hyde Park Declaration for defense
production sharing. This was followed in the early post-war years when
President Harry Truman and Prime Minister Mackenzie King "privately"
negotiated a "draft" free trade agreement. 8 However, the Canadian Prime
Minister decided not to proceed and the negotiations ceased. The next
agreement for free trade between the two nations was in 1965 with the
Auto Pact. 9
6. See Articles of Confederation of the United States, art. 11 (1781).
7. Reisman, The Issue of Free Trade, in U.S.-CANADIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS: NEXT
STEPS? 35-36 (E. Fried & P. Trezize eds. 1984).
8. For a copy of the draft agreement, see R. GWYN, THE 49TH PARADOX 337-40 (1985).
9. Agreement Concerning Automotive Products, Jan. 16, 1965, United States-Canada.
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The bilateral trade history indicates that Canada from its pre-confed-
eration era forward has had a recurring interest in obtaining secure access
to the United States' market; the United States, while remaining inter-
ested, has not actively sought reciprocal access. Over the years there has
been a recurring debate about the sovereign consequences for Canada of
its close relations with the United States. The pervasive influence of the
United States cannot be denied in trade and investment patterns and, to
some extent, in culture. The impact has been less marked on Canadian
political institutions, norms, traditions, and agendas, which differ sub-
stantially from those of the United States. 10
Many of the existing Canada-United States trade barriers and irritants
result from fundamental differences in the ideologies of the two nations.
While Canadians quietly embrace "Peace, Order and Good Government,"
Americans proudly proclaim "Give me Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of
Happiness."
III. Automotive Production: The
Cornerstone of North American Trade
Notwithstanding the magnitude of the trade relationship, no compre-
hensive agreement, framework, or dispute resolution mechanism has been
implemented, except in certain areas such as the automotive sector and
defense production sharing. Automotive trade (completed vehicles and
parts) is the cornerstone of economic and trade relationships between
Canada and the United States, in 1985 totaling more than U.S. $50 billion
in two-way trade and comprising over 35% of all Canadian exports to the
United States. Automotive production is an important element in the
domestic economies of both countries, employing a significant portion of
the total work force. For twenty-two years the Agreement Concerning
Automotive Products I I (the 'Agreement') has shaped Canada-United States
trade and the structure of the North American automotive industry. The
Agreement was an imaginative and vital response to a complex situation
that threatened the entire structure of Canada-United States trade in the
early 1960s.
A. THE SETTING
The North American automotive industry in the early 1960s was char-
acterized by common ownership, comparatively identical products, and
10. Gibbins, Free Trade in Political Ideologies: The Impact of Reduced Trade Barriers
on Canadian Political Life, in 16(3) THE AMERICAN REVIEW OF CANADIAN STUDIES 253
(1986).
11. Supra note 9.
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geographic concentration in southern Ontario and the American upper
midwest region. The United States' industry was highly integrated, di-
versified, technically innovative, and profitable. The Canadian automotive
industry had been established in Canada half a century earlier as an out-
post of the American industry. From its inception until the signing of the
Agreement, Canadian automotive production was not significant enough
to create economies of scale. With one-tenth the population of the United
States, it produced virtually all models of vehicles that were being pro-
duced in the United States. 12 Canada, as a high-cost duplicate (in min-
iature) of the American industry, producing a full range of makes and
models, was unable to achieve economies of scale. The result was an
inefficient industry characterized by consumer prices 10% to 15% (ex-
cluding federal and provincial sales taxes and adjusting for the exchange
rate) greater for the finished product in Canada than in the United States, 13
while Canadian employees earned substantially less than their American
counterparts.
The automotive industry was important to Canada; it was its second
largest employer. Large volumes of major components were imported
into Canada, whereas Canadian automotive exports at the time consisted
predominantly of parts and accessories. Canada as a whole was tied
irrevocably to the American automotive industry and the American econ-
omy in general, purchasing 20% of American exports in 1964, which was
approximately 65% of Canadian imports for that year. In the same year
the United States imported 55% of Canadian exports (being 23% of Amer-
ican world imports). 14
The economic consequence was a Canadian industry protected by tariff
barriers and content rules that encouraged Canadian assembly of motor
vehicles. These protections were not, however, sufficient to enable the
Canadian industry to become competitive and viable. The Canadian Gov-
ernment attempted to rectify its inefficient automotive production and
automotive trade deficit through exports. In 1961 a one-man Royal Com-
mission (Dean Vincent W. Bladen) issued the Bladen Report, 15 which
recommended revised tariffs, excise reductions, and duty-free access by
manufacturers of vehicles, original and replacement components, pro-
vided that they met a specified level of Canadian content. He stated: "My
concern is to reconcile the interest of the consumer in low prices, that of
12. For example, in 1964 General Motors of Canada, Limited produced twenty passenger
car models on two production lines in one plant in Canada.
13. See the Annual Reports of the President to the Congress on the Operation of the
Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965.
14. STATISTICS CANADA.
15. V. BLADEN, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
(1961).
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the automotive producers in profits and employment and that of the pro-
ducers of primary products in export markets."
16
Bladen concluded that the problems that the Canadian automotive in-
dustry was experiencing resulted from its low-volume production runs for
a large number of vehicle models. Bladen broadly favored closer integra-
tion of the American and Canadian segments of the industry and suggested
domestic content requirements as a means to achieve this.
In 1962 the Canadian Government adopted a duty remission program
to expand exports 17 in an attempt to increase Canadian output and em-
ployment while lowering production costs. The program allowed Canadian
automotive manufacturers a remission of duty on imported vehicles and
parts in an amount proportional to the increase in Canadian content in
the manufacturer's exports from Canada. The pilot program permitted
manufacturers to obtain a remission of duties paid on transmissions and
incomplete engines imported into Canada to the extent that Canadian
value added surpassed that for the motor vehicle year 1962. The program 18
was finalized with dollar-for-dollar duty remission on vehicles and parts
for those who qualified as Canadian manufacturers on all imports of orig-
inal equipment components and motor vehicles. Canada experienced a
substantial increase in exports to the United States in the years 1962-64.
While the United States Government did not react to the pilot plan, it
was forced to address the plan in its finalized form. On April 15, 1964,
Modine Manufacturing Company, an American company that produced
radiators, filed a petition 19 with the United States Department of the
Treasury seeking a 25% countervailing duty, alleging that the Canadian
remission program created a "bounty or grant." Negotiations between
the governments of Canada and the United States commenced. A trade
war was averted when the parties negotiated a resolution of the dispute
that was mutually acceptable, thus preserving their unique relations. The
Agreement was signed on January 16, 1965, at Johnson City, Texas, by
Prime Minister Pearson and President Johnson.
B. THE AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTION AGREEMENT
The Agreement does not contain all of the terms of what is commonly
referred to as the Auto Pact. The term Auto Pact refers to:
16. Id.
17. Pilot Program, Order in Council P.C. 1962 1/1536, passed pursuant to § 22 of the
Financial Administration Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-10 (Oct. 26, 1962) (unpublished).
18. Full program, P.C. 1963 1/1344, passed pursuant to the Financial Administration Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. F-10 (Oct. 22, 1963) (unpublished).
19. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 303 (1958).
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* Agreement Concerning Automotive Products Between the Govern-
ment of the United States and the Government of Canada of January
16, 1965 (with Annexes) (the "Agreement");
" Letters of Undertaking of the Canadian Manufacturers of January 13
and 14, 1965;
" Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965;20 and
" Orders in Council. 2 1
The Agreement, in acknowledging the determination of both governments
to strengthen their economic relations with each other, provides as its
objectives:
" the expansion of automotive markets and economic growth while
continuing to promote multilateral trade;
" the expansion of trade (automotive) through reduction and/or elimi-
nation of tariff and all other barriers to trade operating to impede or
distort the full and efficient development of both countries' trade and
industrial potential with a view to enabling the industries of both
countries to participate on a fair and equitable basis in the expansion
of the total market of both countries;
* the development and growth of the automotive industry in Canada
and the United States; and
" the development of conditions in which market forces may operate
effectively to attain the most economic pattern of investment, pro-
duction, and trade. 22
The Auto Pact by its terms is not, per se, a free trade agreement. It
contains conditions (commonly referred to as "safeguards") for duty-free
treatment of motor vehicles and original equipment parts that are incon-
sistent with the concept of "bilateral free trade." It is a conditional agree-
ment providing for the economic integration of the automotive industry
in North America. The conditional aspect is buttressed by safeguards in
the Agreement and in the "voluntary" Letters of Undertaking received
by Canada from the Canadian manufacturers, which vary slightly from
corporation to corporation, guaranteeing that the Canadian share of the
market will be proportionate to its consumption level. The conditions for
duty-free entry of manufactured vehicles and specified parts for use as
original equipment are not identical in both countries.
20. United States' implementation was effected by the Automotive Products Trade Act
of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-283, 79 Stat. 1016 (1965), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2033 (1982).
21. Canadian implementation was effected by Order in Council P.C. 1965-99, 143 SOR/
25(65) and Order in Council P.C. 1965-100, 147 SOR/65-43.
22. Supra note I1, Art. I.
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C. DUTY-FREE ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES
Under the Auto Pact, duty-free entry into the United States from Can-
ada is allowed for:
* finished vehicles and chassis therefor (excluding electric trolley buses,
three-wheeled vehicles, or trailers accompanying truck tractors or
chassis therefor), and
" fabricated components (excluding trailers, tires, or tubes for tires)
for use as original equipment in the manufacture of motor vehicles
described in the previous subparagraph, provided that the Canadian,
American, or combined Canadian/American content is 50% of the
value of the motor vehicles and specified original equipment parts.23
The content requirement is in-product content for each item im-
ported, rather than an aggregate content level of a product line or an
aggregate content per motor vehicle year.24
The right to import motor vehicles duty-free into the United States from
Canada is available to any importer (including individuals), while original
equipment parts may only be imported by or for the account of a bona
fide motor vehicle manufacturer in the United States.
In limiting the duty-free treatment of motor vehicles and original equip-
ment parts to Canada, the United States implemented the Agreement as
an exception under article XXV(5) of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and obtained a waiver under the GATT with respect
to its most favored nation tariff obligations.
D. DUTY-FREE ENTRY INTO CANADA
Canada's implementation of the Auto Pact was on a multilateral basis
and, accordingly, it did not seek a GATT waiver. Canada extends duty-
free treatment of motor vehicles or original equipment parts to any coun-
try, provided that the importer is a manufacturer of motor vehicles 25 in
23. Id. Annex B.
24. August Ist to July 31st.
25. Supra note 11, Annex A. Manufacturer of motor vehicles, namely automobiles, buses,
or specified commercial vehicles is defined to mean a manufacturer that:
(a) produced vehicles in Canada of that class in each of the four consecutive quarters in
the base year (August 1, 1963 to July 31, 1964); and
(b) produced vehicles in Canada of that class in the period of twelve months ending on
the 31st day of July in which the importation is made provided that:
(i) the ratio of the net sales value to the net sales value of all vehicles of that class
sold for consumption in Canada by the manufacturer in that period is equal to or
higher than the ratio of the net sales value of all vehicles of that class produced
in Canada by the manufacturer in the base year to the net sales value of all vehicles
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Canada and complies with the conditions discussed below. Canada ac-
cords duty-free treatment to the following products: 26
" automobiles 27 provided that they are imported by a manufacturer of
automobiles and parts/accessories therefor (excluding tires and tubes)
when imported for use as original equipment in automobiles to be
produced in Canada by a manufacturer of automobiles;
" buses 28 provided that they are imported by a manufacturer of buses
and parts/accessories therefor (excluding tires and tubes) when im-
ported for use as original equipment in buses to be produced in
Canada by a manufacturer of buses; and
" specified commercial vehicles 29 provided that they are imported by
a manufacturer of specified commercial vehicles and part/accessories
therefor (excluding tires, tubes, and certain machines and articles)
when imported for use as original equipment in buses to be produced
in Canada by a manufacturer of specified commercial vehicles.
A manufacturer of motor vehicles is obliged under the Agreement to
meet two conditions relating to vehicle assembly in Canada and to the
level of Canadian value added to vehicles. Firstly, a manufacturer is
required to maintain a ratio of vehicles assembled in Canada to those
vehicles of the same class sold in Canada for consumption in each motor
vehicle year.30 The minimum ratio under the Agreement required that 75
vehicles be produced in Canada for every 100 sold there (increased to
95:100 in 1969 for passenger vehicles). However, the Agreement provides
that if a particular manufacturer had a greater ratio in the 1964 base year
(for example produced 80 vehicles for every 100 sold in the same vehicle
class), then this higher ratio is that particular manufacturer's minimum
production-to-sales ratio. Individual manufacturer's production-to-sales
ratios are not publicly disclosed.
Secondly, the minimum content added in each motor vehicle year for
each class of vehicles must not be less than that achieved by the individual
of that class sold for consumption in Canada by the manufacturer in the base year,
and is not in any case lower than seventy-five to one hundred; and
(ii) the Canadian value added is equal to or greater than the Canadian value added of
all vehicles of that class produced in Canada by the manufacturer in the base year.
26. Id.
27. Id. Automobile is defined as a four-wheeled passenger automobile having a seating
capacity of not more than ten people.
28. Id. Bus is defined as a passenger motor vehicle having a seating capacity for more
than ten persons, or a chassis therefor (excluding the following vehicles or chassis therefor:
electric trackless trolley bus, amphibious vehicle, tracked or half-tracked vehicle or motor
vehicle designed primarily for off-highway use).
29. Id. Specified commercial vehicle is defined to mean a motor truck, motor truck chassis,
ambulance or chassis therefor, or hearse or chassis therefor.
30. Id.
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manufacturer for that particular class of vehicles in the 1964 base year.3 1
Canadian value added includes raw materials, components, labor, ship-
ping, and burden (electricity, taxes, etc.). 32 This provision is substantially
different from the American counterpart, which requires 50% "North
American" content. 3 3 The Canadian content provision does not apply to
particular in-product content as does the American, but rather is based
on total Canadian value added to a particular class of motor vehicles
during the motor vehicle year. Effectively, this enables Canadian manu-
facturers to import into Canada motor vehicles without any North Amer-
ican content.
In addition to the foregoing guarantees, Canada, through the Letters
of Undertaking with each of the Canadian manufacturers, implemented
other safeguards into the Auto Pact as follows: The first commitment was
that the Canadian producers as a group would increase Canadian value
added by Can. $260 million by the end of the 1968 model year. Each
Canadian producer's share of this $260 million was added to its 1964 base
for purposes of calculating its Canadian value-added attainment require-
ment. The second commitment (known as the "growth formula") requires
each Canadian producer to increase in each trade year the amount of
Canadian value added in vehicles produced (assembled) in Canada (i) by
60% of the increase in cost of sales of passenger cars in Canada over the
1964 base year and (ii) by 50% of the increase in cost of sales of commercial
vehicles over the 1964 base year.34 Further, the Canadian Government
reserved the right to designate a manufacturer that does not come within
the foregoing guidelines as being entitled to the benefits of full duty-free
treatment under Annex A of the Agreement.
E. PROBLEMS AND IRRITANTS
Measured against its stated objectives, the Auto Pact has been a suc-
cess, laying the foundation for the integration of American and Canadian
automotive industries while encouraging its rationalization during the
1960s. 35 Although the United States still has a dominance over Canada
31. Id.
32. Address by Eugene L. Hartwig, Vice President and Associate General Counsel,
General Motors Corporation, "The Auto Pact," Section of International Law & Practice of
the American Bar Association, Detroit, Michigan (Feb. 15, 1985).
33. Supra note 23.
34. Supra note 32.
35. UNITED STATES OFFICE OF AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY AFFAIRS, ANALYSIS OF U.S.-
CANADIAN AUTOMOTIVE TRADE ISSUES, Attachment at page 4 (1985); Address given by
Timothy Stock, Assistant General Counsel, Ford Motor Company, at the Detroit Athletic
Club (Apr. 21, 1985).
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in the automotive sector, Canada has had access under the Auto Pact to
the world's largest automotive market and has achieved increased pro-
duction, expanded trade productivity, increased employment, and lower
consumer prices.
The Auto Pact has attracted criticism from its inception. The fact that
the United States implemented the Auto Pact on a bilateral basis and that
Canada did so on a multilateral basis has led to differences in how each
country may deal with third countries in the automotive sector. The United
States Trade Representative has denounced Canada's current duty re-
missions as a violation of the GATT. American domestic industry is calling
for changes in the Auto Pact to correct what it feels is an imbalance in
Canada's favor with regard to offshore automotive investment.
The Auto Pact, which may be terminated by either country on one
year's notice to the other, does not address the period of existence of the
safeguards. It has always been the position of the United States Govern-
ment, 36 of many in the industry, and of some in Canada that the safeguards
were to be of a temporary duration. In fact, the United States Government
disavows the "production-sharing" concept. "The United States has re-
jected the 'fair share' concept on the grounds that the Auto Pact is a
limited free trade arrangement, not a market sharing agreement, or a
mechanism to manage an industrial strategy for the auto industry.' 37
Critics allege that the purpose of the safeguards was to give Canada an
adjustment period to develop a viable automotive industry. In contrast,
the Canadian Government has treated them as a permanent element of
the Auto Pact and has used them as an impetus to encourage automotive
investment and expansion in Canada by motor vehicle manufacturers
under the Auto Pact. 38
The duty remissions of the 1960s in Canada had been withdrawn when
the Auto Pact was implemented. In 1975, however, Canada introduced
an Automotive Component Remission Order, 39 which created a duty re-
mission program to encourage exports of Canadian automotive parts and
to encourage offshore investment from automotive producers who were
not covered under the Auto Pact. The program, which gave duty remis-
sions to vehicle importers who purchased original equipment parts from
Canadian exporters, was extended in 1978 to give duty remission credit
36. Id. at 1, 5.
37. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REPORT ON THE NORTH
AMERICAN TRADE ARRANGEMENT 54 (1981).
38. Even at the initiation of the Auto Pact, Canada required assurances from the man-
ufacturers before signing. For example, in 1965 Ford announced a new plant for St. Thomas,
Ontario. Address by Timothy Stock, Assistant General Counsel, Ford Motor Company, at
the Detroit Athletic Club (Apr. 21, 1985).
39. Order in Council P.C. 1975-1024, SOR/75-58.
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for Canadian value added on exported original equipment parts and re-
placement parts. In 1981 an individual duty remission program was de-
veloped with Volkswagen, which was then planning on opening a second
assembly plant in the United States and wanted duty-free treatment for
its vehicles exported to Canada. Volkswagen agreed to make an invest-
ment of $100 million in a parts manufacturing plant in Canada that would
export virtually all of its production to the United States. In 1985 Volks-
wagen was allowed to decrease its investment commitment by 50% while
retaining all of the benefits granted to it by the Canadian Government in
1981.40 1984 saw the implementation of a program to provide foreign
vehicle importers with duty remissions in an amount equal to 70% of the
Canadian value added in its purchases of original equipment parts ex-
ported from Canada.
It has been alleged that the Canadian remission programs violate the
spirit of the Auto Pact and the GATT Subsidies Code. 4 1 Transition within
the industry in the last twenty years has created a shrinking North Amer-
ican domestic market. As the North American automotive corporations
continue to experience the impact of this decline, pressure between the
two countries has increased in relation to the shared objectives for the
Auto Pact. 42 The United States' policy of nonintervention in its domestic
industries 43 is in marked contrast to Canada's active role in attracting
and financially supporting new and existing operations in Canada.
At each stage in the evolution of the Canadian automotive sector, any
threat to Canada's fair share of automotive manufacturing relative to
domestic consumption has been countered by domestic policies-whether
tariffs, content schemes or manufacturing requirements-that have sought
automotive investment, production and employment in Canada. 4
4
40. The United States voiced objection to the duty remissions program and in particular
to the Volkswagen agreement. In 1981 Ambassador Macdonald, Deputy United States Trade
Representative, sent letters to Robert Latimer, Assistant Deputy Minister of Trade and
Commerce, Canada.
41. UNITED STATES OFFICE OF AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY AFFAIRS, supra note 38, at 8;
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1190 (Oct. I, 1986). The former study indicates that use of the
remission program in Canada has ballooned in recent years and has eroded benefits to the
"Big Four" under the Auto Pact while diverting business from the United States to Canada.
42. THE AUTOMOTIVE AGREEMENT IN A CANADA-UNITED STATES COMPREHENSIVE TRADE
ARRANGEMENT (1986). Note that this study was not prepared by the Canadian Government
but by the outside consulting firm of Grey, Clark, Shih and Associates Limited.
43. The United States Department of Commerce (USDC) defined the policy issue in terms
of economic adjustment to changing offshore market conditions and competition, concluded
that the United States automotive industry had the capabilities to make the required ad-
justments, and recommended against additional trade protection for this sector. See USDC,
THE UNITED STATES AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY (1983).
44. FEDERAL TASK FORCE OF THE CANADIAN MOTOR VEHICLE AND AUTOMOTIVE PARTS
INDUSTRIES, AN AUTOMOTIVE STRATEGY FOR CANADA (1983).
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That is not to say, however, that the United States has not provided
subsidies and incentives for new offshore investment and new investment
by domestic corporations. Subsidies and inducements to invest have been
granted at the state level in the United States, as opposed to a combined
federal/provincial level in Canada. The provision of inducements and sub-
sidies, coupled in Canada with its duty remission program for parts ex-
ports, has created an ongoing tension between the countries in the
automotive sector. Canadian Government support in the automotive sec-
tor, coupled with its remissions to offshore producers, has resulted in the
most serious rift in automotive trade relations between the two countries
since 1964.
F. SUMMARY
The Auto Pact is a sectoral agreement with conditions attached. As an
example of a successful bilateral agreement in a multilateral trading en-
vironment, it was a practical response to a trade war that loomed between
Canada and the United States in 1965, resolving the interests of both
countries while serving the needs of the industry. It has fulfilled the ex-
pectations of its negotiators. The foresight and ingenuity that created the
Auto Pact requires continuing objective examination of its operation in
both countries. The Auto Pact did not attempt to address all of the au-
tomotive issues existing between Canada and the United States at the
time. Its essential purpose was to obtain for Canada a better share of
North American assembly and parts production and employment than it
had in 1964, without imposing additional penalties on the Canadian con-
sumer or Canadian labor. It sought to achieve this objective by introducing
conditional free trade with the United States in this sector, combined with
a guarantee of certain minimum assembly and parts production in Canada
relative to Canadian vehicle consumption. It more than achieved its lim-
ited objectives. 45
With the transition of the automotive industry during the last decade
from one of United States' world dominance to one with an increasing
offshore presence, it becomes evident that the Auto Pact fails to reflect
the global character of the automotive business and the reality of overseas
import competition. The Auto Pact, while not originally an issue in the
negotiations, has been added to the list of contentious matters being dis-
cussed because of increasing concern with the Canadian remissions pro-
gram. Whether or not the Auto Pact will remain a viable trade agreement
and whether or not it will be amended or altered to reflect the changes
45. MINISTER OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE
CANADIAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 231 (1978).
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created by the internationalization of the industry is an issue that will
remain at the forefront of Canada-United States relations. 46
IV. Background to the Trade Negotiations
The current trade enhancement negotiations between Canada and the
United States grew out of the 1983 trade policy review released by the
then Liberal Government of Canada. 47 Talks between the two govern-
ments stemming from this report focused primarily on a sectoral form of
trade agreement. Areas discussed for potential economic integration be-
tween the two countries included agricultural equipment, informatics,
urban transportation equipment, and steel. 48 The impetus for developing
the preliminary explorations into negotiations essentially ceased with the
Canadian federal election in 1984, which placed the Progressive Conser-
vative party in power.
A. CANADIAN DISCUSSION PAPER ON
CANADIAN ACCESS TO EXPORT MARKETS
In January 1985 the Canadian Government released a discussion paper
on enhancing Canadian access to export markets. 49 The Canadian Gov-
ernment stated in this paper that Canada's "first and most important
priority" was to secure and expand Canadian access to world export
markets and in particular to those of the United States. 50 As part of that
priority, the government indicated that it would make a careful analysis
of options for bilateral trade liberalization with the United States "in close
consultation with the provinces and private industry." 51
46. As of the end of August 1987, the status of the Auto Pact in the negotiations remained
unclear. On the one hand, Premier David Peterson of Ontario had indicated that he would
not be prepared to approve a Free Trade Agreement which undermined the Auto Pact, and
on March 16, 1987, Federal Trade Minister Patricia Carney had introduced a motion in
Parliament stating that the auto industry in Canada would have to continue to be protected
within the framework of a Free Trade Agreement. On the other hand, during the month of
August the American Trade negotiator, Peter Murphy, was emphatic that the Auto Pact was
indeed a poor consideration, and that some movement would have to be forthcoming from
his Canadian counterpart.
47. MINISTER OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, DEP'T OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADIAN TRADE
POLICY FOR THE 1980s: A DISCUSSION PAPER (1983).
48. For more information on the sectoral free trade considerations between the two nations
see U.S.-CANADIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS: NEXT STEPS? (E. Fried & P. Trezize eds. 1984);
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF SECTORAL INTEGRATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA (H. King, Jr. ed. 1985); CANADA/U.S. TRADE RELATIONS (H. Radebaugh & E.
Fry eds. 1985).
49. MINISTER OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, DEP'T OF INT'L TRADE, HOW TO SECURE AND
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In analyzing the future for Canada-United States trade relations, the
paper outlined and discussed four options:
* maintain the status quo of the relationship;
e negotiate sectoral or functional trade arrangements that go beyond
existing GATT rules and agreements as a means of securing and
widening market access for Canada in the United States;
e investigate whether or not the negotiation of a comprehensive trading
arrangement between Canada and the United States that provided
for the removal of tariff and nontariff barriers on substantially all
bilateral trade would be a reasonable alternative; and
* establish a framework agreement.
The paper focused on whether Canada should enter into multilateral or
bilateral trading relationships while stressing the need to pursue both
avenues in a mutually reinforcing environment.
B. QUEBEC SUMMIT
Two months later, at the Quebec Summit, Prime Minister Mulroney
and President Reagan made a commitment to bilateral trade enhancement
between the two nations in the Quebec Declaration on Trade in Goods
and Services (the 'Declaration'), which mandated the exploration of means
to reduce and eliminate existing barriers to trade between the two coun-
tries, enhance market access, halt protectionism, and facilitate trade be-
tween Canada and the United States. 52 Under the Declaration, the Canadian
Minister for International Trade and the United States Trade Represen-
tative were required to report within six months on ways of reducing or
eliminating trade barriers between the two countries.
C. THE MACDONALD COMMISSION REPORT
On September 16, 1985, the Report by the Royal Commission on the
Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (the Macdonald
Report)53 was released. The three-year, $20 million study culminated in
a three-volume report summarizing seventy-two background volumes.
The Macdonald Report, in general, concluded that protective mechanisms
in the Canadian economy should be dismantled and the forces of the
marketplace be allowed to operate to foster competitiveness, entrepre-
neurship, and prosperity.
52. Declaration by the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States
of America Regarding Trade in Goods and Services, Mar. 18, 1985, United States-Canada,
reprinted in MINISTRY OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, CANADIAN TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, SE-
LECTED DOCUMENTS 13 (1985).
53. MINISTER OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE
ECONOMIC UNION AND DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS FOR CANADA, VOL. 1 (1985).
VOL. 22, NO. 2
CANADA-U.S. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 361
The Macdonald Report recommended, in its discussion on Canadian
trade, 54 that Canada negotiate and enter into a free trade agreement with
the United States. Three basic elements of a potential Canada-United
States trade agreement were analyzed, namely:
" the format or procedural framework for the negotiations; i.e., sectoral
versus across-the-board free trade negotiations;
" the substantive provisions of the resulting "treaty" or agreement;
i.e., nontariff barriers, safeguards, contingent protection; and
" procedural and legal mechanisms of implementation and enforcement
of a trade agreement.
It emphasized that these elements must be analyzed with regard to the
concerns of Canadians. Barrier-free market access that is dependable and
secure and that will not be eroded by any future political climate or legal
challenge is a required element of any agreement if Canadian industry is
going to make the commitment and resulting adaptations needed in order
to penetrate the American market. Finally, it stated that assurances to
Canadians of national autonomy in social, economic, and defense policies
must be given.
The study analyzed the various formats of sectoral arrangements, a
common market, a customs union, and a comprehensive free trade area
between Canada and the United States. The Commission concluded that
a free trade agreement would yield the greatest benefits for Canada while
minimizing the costs of the various other formats and the costs of main-
taining the status quo. While the commissioners did not foresee the au-
tomatic exclusion of any sectors from consideration at the negotiations,
they did foresee the possibility of exceptions arising during the course of
the negotiations with the United States. Trade in service industries (e.g.,
banking, insurance, and financial services) were identified as potential
extension sectors of the trade areas traditionally dealt with under the
GATT. Cultural activities were identified as an area that might require
special treatment under any resulting agreement.
The commissioners stated that a Canada-United States free trade agree-
ment should regulate and ideally eliminate three types of barriers between
the two nations: tariffs; contingent protection measures (antidumping du-
ties, countervailing duties, and safeguard or escape clause actions); and
other nontariff barriers (laws or regulations that explicitly or indirectly
impose discriminatory burdens on goods of foreign origin such as gov-
ernment procurement practices, labeling requirements, and quality stan-
dards). Contingent protectionist measures and nontariff barriers were
identified as important items to be dealt with in an agreement for Canadian
54. Id. at 297-385.
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industry in order to ensure its long-term access to the United States'
market.
The Commission recommended that:
* Canada negotiate a free trade agreement with the United States while
continuing to support multilateral efforts in the reduction and elim-
ination of trade barriers;
* an office of Special Trade Negotiator be created that would report
directly to the Prime Minister;
" tariffs between the two countries be reduced to zero within ten years;
" a "fast-track" method be used in the tariff reductions-more partic-
ularly, that the United States would reduce its tariffs over a five-year
period and Canada over a ten-year period, since Canada has the
greater vulnerability and need for adjustment;
" safeguards be incorporated into a free trade agreement that would
ensure that the United States would not use its "stronger economic
position" to attempt to influence Canada in areas not directly related
to the trading relationship, such as foreign policy; and
" a three-tiered body be established to administer and enforce the
agreement.
The commissioners determined that adjustment problems in Canada
would be greater than in the United States in both the labor force and
the field of investment. Any agreement should contain transitional safe-
guards for Canada. Transitional assistance to Canadian industry should
be included in any agreement and could take several forms, including
government-backed loans, research and development grants, or tax
concessions such as accelerated depreciation of expenditures incurred in
adapting Canadian operations for the United States' market. The form of
assistance recommended by the Commissioners was a program that would
support displaced workers while accelerating their retraining or reem-
ployment. Additionally, adjustment subsidies or assistance would have to
be explicitly provided for in the agreement. 55
The Macdonald Report stated that a free trade agreement should be
implemented through either a treaty or legislation at the federal and pro-
vincial/state levels. The legislative method would likely prove to be im-
possible to implement uniformly at the provincial/state level. The legislative
format would not provide the security of long-term access to the United
States' market that a treaty would. This might well be an important con-
sideration for Canadian manufacturers before making the commitment,
monetary expenditures, and adaptations to penetrate the United States'
market. The Macdonald Report argued that a treaty would give future
security of competitiveness on a long-term basis in the American market.
55. Id.
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Unfortunately, it would require a two-thirds majority approval of the
United States Senate-which might prove a difficult, if not impossible,
goal in view of the current protectionist mood in Washington. The pre-
ferred route to take, according to the Macdonald Commission, and in fact
the one that is being used, was that of the "fast-track" procedure under
the Trade Act of 197456 as extended under the Trade Agreements Act of
1979. 57
The commissioners recommended that an intergovernmental adminis-
trative entity be established to implement and monitor the agreement with
a legally binding process for resolution of any disagreements arising under
the free trade agreement. The three-tiered body would be composed of:
" a Ministerial Committee that would make major decisions on the
interpretation and implementation of the agreement;
" a Trade Commission that would serve an administrative function in
providing advice, research, and investigation; and
* an arbitration panel with binding authority to resolve disputes on the
interpretation of the agreement to be composed of two Americans,
two Canadians, and one neutral member.
Simultaneously, the strengthening of the GATT, the International Mon-
etary Fund, and other multilateral or international economic entities would
be a priority for Canada. Finally, assurances to Canadians of national
autonomy in social, economic, and defense policies must be given in any
agreement.
D. CANADIAN PROPOSAL TO EXPLORE NEGOTIATIONS
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney announced on September 26, 1985, that
Canada would "propose" trade negotiations with the United States.
58
The statement, based on the written recommendations of the Minister for
International Trade, James Kelleher,59 arose out of the Quebec Summit
Declaration of the previous March. At the time of the announcement, the
Canadian Prime Minister stated: "We want to negotiate the broadest pos-
sible package of mutually-beneficial reductions in tariff and nontariff bar-
riers between our two countries." 60
56. 19 U.S.C. § 2112, 2486 (1982).
57. Id. § 1101.
58. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Statement to the House of Commons (Sept. 26, 1985),
reprinted in MINISTER OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, CANADIAN TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, SE-
LECTED DOCUMENTS 73 (1985).
59. The Honorable J. Kelleher, Report to the Prime Minister by the Minister for Inter-
national Trade (Sept. 17, 1985), reprinted in MINISTER OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, CANADIAN
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, SELECTED DOCUMENTS 65 (1985).
60. Supra note 58.
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The Canadian Trade Minister concluded that a trade agreement with
the United States should be directly explored. 61 He went on to state that
he "envisaged" such negotiations commencing in early 1986.62
The statement delineated Canada's "broad objectives" in negotiating
an agreement as follows:
" to save jobs in the short term and to create jobs in the medium and
long term;
" to strengthen the economy in all geographic regions of Canada;
* to stimulate balanced growth and job creation throughout the nation
(Canada);
* to allow all Canadians to share in the benefits of this national effort;
" to strengthen the economic basis for Canadian cultural objectives;
" to secure and enhance Canadian access to the United States' market
by enshrining a better set of rules whereby Canadian trade is con-
ducted; and
" to develop a more predictable environment for trade and investment
in Canada. 63
Simultaneously, the Canadian Government reaffirmed its commitment
to the GATT and to the achievement of certain established trade objectives
within the multilateral trading system. The Minister stated that comple-
mentary bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations would strengthen the
Canadian economy, Canadian performance in the global marketplace, as
well as bilateral economic relations with Europe, Japan, and the devel-
oping world. This commitment was put forward as an element in the
Progressive Conservative Government's "program of economic renewal"
for Canada. 64 This approach, it was stated, would reinforce Canada's
independence and credibility in foreign policy. The Minister indicated that
the following should be dealt with in any resulting negotiations:
" the manner in which Canadian companies' access to the United States'
market can be frustrated by the use of trade remedy laws;
" the ease with which imports from Canada are swept up in measures
aimed at other countries;
" the continual threat of unilateral changes in the rules of the game;
" the lack of access to the United States' procurement market because
of Buy America provisions at the federal and state levels;
" the large number of United States' tariffs which continue to limit
access to that market; and
" the inadequacy of current mechanisms to resolve disputes. 65
61. Supra note 59.
62. Id.
63. Supra note 59.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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The Canadian Minister concluded that a trade agreement would save
Canadian jobs currently threatened by protectionist measures in the short
term and would create better jobs in the long term. He went on to assert
that Canadian cultural identity would not be open for negotiation and that
the government would only "pursue a negotiation which increases the
well being of all Canadians."
6 6
E. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE ON TRADE WITH CANADA
Ambassador Clayton Yeutter released his report to the President re-
sponding to the Canadian initiative on the same day, and stated that:
Canada is a vital and integral player in the global marketplace. I welcome this
opportunity for bilateral discussions with our neighbor and largest trading part-
ner. This marks the beginning of greater, perhaps even historic, opportunities
for both countries. I will soon begin consultations with the Senate Finance and
House Ways and Means committees and our private sector on the desirability
and objectives of such a bilateral negotiation. 67
In his report, Ambassador Yeutter indicated several ways in which the
United States could reduce and eliminate barriers to bilateral trade both
in goods and services with Canada. Yeutter confirmed the United States'
commitment to further liberalization of trade, whether bilateral or multi-
lateral. A restated commitment was made to the strengthening of the
multilateral trading system through a new round of negotiations under the
auspices of the GATT, reflecting the President's statement made earlier
in the week. The Ambassador indicated that a number of United States'
industries "have an interest in expanding their access to a prosperous and
proximate Canadian market. ' 68 Significant barriers to United States' ex-
ports to Canada in particular sectors were identified as:
" high Canadian tariffs across a wide spectrum of products that act as
major impediments to United States' exports;
" nontariff barriers at both the federal and the provincial levels that
effectively preclude many United States' exports from entering the
Canadian marketplace;
" obstacles to United States' investment in Canada;
" federal and provincial regulations that impede United States' exports
of services; and
66. Id.
67. Ambassador C. Yeutter, Report to the President by the United States Trade Repre-
sentative (Sept. 17, 1985).
68. Id.
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* governmental assistance programs (both at the provincial and federal
level) that subsidize competition. 69
On September 23, 1985, three days prior to the release of Ambassador
Yeutter's report, President Reagan released a major multilateral trade
strategy. It emphasized the importance of an open trading system in the
world marketplace where trade plays a role of increasing importance in
the domestic economies of the majority of nations. 70
In October the Canadian Minister for International Trade clarified the
Canadian proposal and indicated that it was not an invitation for the United
States to negotiate, but rather was merely an invitation to explore the
feasibility of negotiations. 7 1
The United States Senate Finance Committee held a hearing on April
11, 1986, to determine whether to enter into negotiations with Canada for
a comprehensive trade enhancement agreement under the fast-track re-
view. The United States Trade Representative, when testifying that morn-
ing before the Committee, indicated that the Administration and the private
sector advisory committees representing industry, labor, and agriculture
generally gave broad support for entering into the negotiations with Can-
ada. He indicated six broad areas of interest that had been identified and
that would be pursued in the negotiations:
* Tariffs: Canadian tariffs average between 9% and 10% as compared
to the United States' tariffs, which average 4% to 5%. The industries
most concerned with high Canadian tariffs were furniture, telecom-
munications equipment, home appliances, cosmetics, electronics, pa-
per products, recreational boats, aluminum products, wall coverings,
and leather.
* Nontariff Barriers: Concerns were voiced over extensive nontariff
barriers existing at both the provincial and federal level in Canada.
The negotiations should reduce and eliminate these barriers at both
governmental levels. Areas mentioned included government pro-
curement, the alcoholic beverage industry, dairy, meat and poultry,
technical standards in U.S. labor, agriculture, and plywood.
" Foreign Investment in Canada: It was indicated that the present gov-
ernment had significantly improved Canada's investment climate with
the repeal of the Foreign Investment Review Act 72 and its replace-
ment by the Investment Canada Act. 73 However, concern still exists
69. Id.
70. President Ronald Reagan, Information U.S.A. (Sept. 23, 1985).
71. The Honorable J. Kelleher, Statement to the House of Commons (Oct. 1985).
72. Can. Stat. 1973-74, c.46, as amended by Can. Stat. 1976-77, c.52, s.128(2) and Can.
Stat. 1980-81-82, c. 107, s.63.
73. Can. Stat. 1984-85, c.15.
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with regard to Canadian investment policy. It was indicated that the
stated objective would be to "produce a Canadian policy environment
as open to inflows of foreign direct investment as [the United States]."
" Trade in Services: Several sectors stated to have an interest in en-
hanced trade relations were transportation services, informatics,
communications, professional services, and advertising.
" Intellectual Property: The American business community is con-
cerned about the protection of intellectual property in Canada. Areas
where it was felt that Canada does not accord adequate protection
to American ownership are pharmaceuticals and copyright (especially
copyright issues arising in the border broadcasting sector).
" Government Assistance: American industry and Congress have ques-
tioned various forms of Canadian Government assistance at both the
federal and provincial levels.
Extensive opposition emerged at the Senate Finance Committee hearing
into the authorization of fast-track trade negotiations. Committee Chair-
man Robert Packwood indicated that the Committee was "at the end of
its patience" on Canada-United States trade issues such as lumber and
potatoes. Other opposition stemmed from the view that Congress should
take a stronger and more active role in American international trade policy.
Canadian officials expressed surprise and concern over the strong op-
position by several Senators on the Committee.
The debate continued in the Senate Finance Committee on April 22-
23, 1986. In an attempt to avoid denial of authority to enter into the fast-
track trade negotiations with Canada, several of the members of the Com-
mittee met with President Reagan on the morning of April 23. During the
debate the Senate Finance Committee indicated that the individuals in
opposition to the fast-track procedure were not "picking on Canada."
Rather, they were voicing their opposition to the Administration's vague
trade policy. In a close vote, the Administration was given the authority
to commence negotiations on the fast-track procedure. The President, in
correspondence with Senate Finance Committee Chairman Packwood,
assured the Committee that its members would be involved in the ongoing
trade talks with Canada. The President offered assurances that the results
of the negotiations would provide for "comparable treatment for America
and Canada in investment and intellectual property rights in both countries
... while involving outstanding trade disputes." He further assured the
Committee that the United States would continue to apply and enforce
its trade remedy laws against Canada.
Negotiations commenced in Ottawa on May 21, 1986, with Ambassador
Peter Murphy as the Special Negotiator for the Office of the United States
Trade Representative and Ambassador Simon Reisman as the Canadian
negotiator.
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V. Subsidies and Countervailing Duties
A. COUNTERVAILING DUTIES AND THE LUMBER DISPUTE
The countervailing duty provisions of the Trade Agreements Act of
197974 have been used to scrutinize such diverse Canadian products as
raspberries, lumber, and swine. The countervailing duty provisions and
investigatory process are viewed by Canada as a major irritant to trade
relations. Canadian criticisms were several: first, that administrative dis-
cretion under the law is excessive; second, that the legal concepts de-
veloped by the Department of Commerce and by the courts are not always
clear and are subject to change; and third, almost constant threats from
Congress of legislation that would increase the perceived protectionist
effect of the Act.
Accordingly, the Canadian Minister for International Trade recently
stated that one of Canada's major objectives in the pursuit of a trade
agreement with the United States was to "establish better trade rules and
a better framework for settling trade disputes." 75 Several days later, in
referring to the softwood lumber dispute, the Minister voiced the opinion
of many Canadians when she stated that United States' trade laws (coun-
tervailing duties and antidumping provisions) are often employed in an
unjustified manner against Canadians.76
On May 19, 1986, an American lumber industry coalition filed a coun-
tervailing duty petition with the Department of Commerce, alleging that
lumber imports from Canada were being subsidized through the practices
of the provincial government in awarding rights for harvesting trees on
provincial government property. They alleged that the provincial stump-
age fees gave Canadian industry an unfair advantage over the domestic
industry in the United States. The petition was similar to a petition filed
three years earlier, which had been dismissed in favor of the Canadian
lumber industry.
In the 1983 dispute between Canada and the United States over the
alleged subsidization of the lumber industry in Canada, American pro-
ducers alleged that differences in costs between Canadian and American
lumber were the result of subsidization by the provincial governments of
stumpage fees. 77 The International Trade Commission report concluded
that there was no significant subsidization. 78 One reason for such a finding
74. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1671f (1986).
75. The other objectives referred to included secure access to the American market, and
elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers. Address by The Honorable Pat Carney, Canadian
Club, Vancouver, British Columbia (Nov. 17, 1986).
76. Address by The Honorable Pat Carney, Americas Society, New York (Nov. 21, 1986).
77. Government of Canada, The Forests and the Trees, 17(I) CANADA TODAY/D'Au-
JOURD'HuI (1985).
78. Id.
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is that Canadian lumber firms tend to be larger and have invested in
modernizing their plants and equipment at a greater rate than their Amer-
ican counterparts, resulting in a productivity advantage based on the
economies of scale. 79 In turn, Canadian competition has benefited Amer-
ican consumers. 80
However, a new definition of "subsidies" has arisen based on the ap-
pellate decision of Cabot Corp. v. United States.81 The petition alleged
that the price that the Canadian provincial governments charge to the
lumber industry in Canada for removing timber from government-owned
forests constitutes a "subsidy-in-kind." The subsidy was claimed to com-
prise approximately 27% of the price of lumber imported into the United
States. American imports of Canadian softwood lumber comprise ap-
proximately 30% of the United States' market.
Canada filed a formal statement protesting the petition. In its statement,
Canada alleged "that the petition was a calculated protectionist action." 82
The statement went on to point out:
[T]he petitioner [the United States' lumber industry] is arguing that counter-
vailing duty should be used to offset another country's comparative advantage
in resources. . . . [T]he Canadian authorities believe strongly that such an
interpretation of the GATT was never intended by the contracting parties and
in particular that it would be an abuse of the remedy provided for in Article
VI. . . . [T]he petitioner appears to rely primarily on the assertion that the
factual situation is clearer now than in 1983, together with the perceived evo-
lution of the Commerce Department's interpretation of the countervailing duty
law since that time. In effect, the petitioner is requesting the Commerce De-
partment to act as its own court of appeal. 83
The statement further alleged that Canadian programs or stumpage fee
systems had not changed since the 1983 petition. Canadians felt that the
United States' action was an unjustified unilateral change in the rules for
measuring subsidies and an attempt to circumvent the 1983 ruling.
During the same week, on May 22, 1986, President Reagan issued an
Order under the escape clause provisions of section 201 of the Trade Act
of 1974.84 The Order increased the tariffs on cedar shakes and shingles
imported into the United States from Canada. The initial increased tariff




81. 3 INT'L TRADE REP. 578 (Apr. 30, 1986).
82. 3 INT'L TRADE REP. 713 (May 28, 1986).
83. Id.
84. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(I) (1986). The Order was based on the finding of the International
Trade Commission that the subsidies granted to Canadian manufacturers of shakes and
shingles were causing injury in the United States market.
85. Id.
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In retaliation to the tariff, Canada imposed duties on certain American
products exported to Canada on the same day that the increased tariff on
shakes and shingles was to take effect, June 6, 1986. Canada's retaliatory
action consisted of the imposition of tariffs on books, periodicals, and
other publications that had been entering Canada duty-free. In 1985 ap-
proximately 90% of Canada's imports in this sector came from the United
States. 86 These particular tariffs should total approximately Can. $36
million per year. Tariffs were also increased on other items including tea,
Christmas trees, oatmeal, rolled oats, diesel rail cars, cider, asphaltum,
oil, ozone generators, and air lifters. The estimated duty on these items
would total approximately Can. $2.5 million per year. In addition, Canada
claimed that it would withdraw from an agreement with the United States
and Japan on computer parts and semiconductors, which could raise Can.
$41 million a year in revenues for the Canadian Government.
On October 16, 1986, the Commerce Department announced that it had
made a preliminary determination that Canada subsidized softwood lum-
ber exports to the United States in the amount of 15%. A final ruling on
the countervailing duty by the Commerce Department was set for no later
than December 30, 1986. If upheld in a final ruling, this finding would
have effectively overruled the 1983 decision that held that the governments
of the provinces of Canada were not granting subsidies in their awarding
of stumpage rights.
The following week the Canadian Import Tribunal commenced an in-
quiry based on the preliminary finding by the Department of Revenue,
Customs and Excise that American grain was being subsidized by ap-
proximately 60%.87 This ruling, coupled with the two American ones
concerning lumber, created considerable friction in Canada-United States
trading relations and could have been the impetus for the derailment of
the fast-track negotiations.
The Commerce Department's preliminary finding was not finalized when
the United States and Canada agreed to an eleventh hour settlement,
resulting in the withdrawal of the lumber coalition's petition. The Cana-
dian Government agreed to impose a Can. $0.15 export tax on softwood
lumber exported to the United States in lieu of the proposed import tariff
in the United States. 88 The export tax is contrary to the terms of the
GATT, which require such a tax to be applied equally to all trading part-
ners. The United States has the right pursuant to this agreement to monitor
the Canadian lumber industry to ensure that the agreement is complied
with and that no further subsidies are granted, and to commence a trade
86. STATISTICS CANADA (1985).
87. The Canada Gazette, Part 1, Nov. 22, 1986, at 5874.
88. Softwood Lumber Products Export Change Act, Can. Stat. 1986-87, c.37.
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action if it believes that the pact has been violated. Canada has the ob-
ligation to provide Washington regularly with statistics and facts relating
to the lumber industry. In return for the settlement, Canada withdrew its
petition to the GATT protesting the U.S. countervailing duty.
The fact remains that the export of Canadian softwood lumber and
cedar shakes and shingles to the United States has been impeded as a
result of complaints of hardship on the part of American industry. The
lumber disputes and resulting settlement of the cedar shakes and shingles
issue have had a negative effect on the Canadian population's support of
a bilateral trade enhancement agreement. Whether the lumber dispute will
have served as a catalyst for the successful negotiation of an agreement,
or will have helped to erode the progress to date, is only speculation at
this time. The lumber disputes appear to have caused the Canadian media
and public to express concern over the trade negotiations between the
countries. Prime Minister Mulroney indicated, however, that it was be-
cause of this type of use of trade law remedy in the United States that
Canada sought free trade talks with the Americans. In marked contrast,
Washington has been firm in explicitly rejecting the grant of any exemption
or special status to Canada from its trade remedy laws in a free trade
agreement. This position has recently been confirmed by Senator Lloyd
Benston, the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. 89
B. SUBSIDIES
Nations throughout the world provide subsidies to attract new invest-
ments, to maintain existing ones, to encourage exports, to redistribute
industry geographically within their borders, to encourage research and
development, and periodically to rescue or rejuvenate a failing i~ndustrial
sector or company. Many subsidies are direct grants or loans and are
easily assessible. Others are indirect or are provided at various stages of
the production cycle and as a result are difficult to evaluate monetarily
in the end product cost.
If Canadians compete in the American market under a trade enhance-
ment agreement, American officials will be closely monitoring Canadian
development programs even though the particular programs may be purely
domestic in their origin. A serious issue between the countries is the
American perception of greater involvement by the Canadian Government
in its domestic economy through industrial policy programs, which alleg-
edly create subsidies for Canadian manufacturers. The people of each
country have a different view of the role of government in business and
89. 3 INT'L TRADE REP. 1480 (Dec. 10, 1986).
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society. Canadians accept a stronger role of government in their daily
lives. In fact, they expect more than their American counterparts in the
way of services, financial aid, and other support systems from their gov-
ernment. Historically, the United States has based its ideology on pro-
tecting individual rights and freedoms in lieu of government intervention
in the lives of its citizens, while Canadians look to their government as
the protector of the population at large. The evolution of both nations
has been very similar and yet inherent differences have caused the gov-
ernments of each nation to address their roles in the intervention into and
solution of problems in very different ways. Subsidies exist in the United
States, but they are more piecemeal and are less extensive at the federal
level than at the state level.
A bilateral trade enhancement agreement will have to achieve a balance
between the differing practices of the respective governments for the
implementation of subsidies. It should aim at achieving a proper domestic
rationale, as opposed to creating an unfair competitive advantage in the
Canada-United States marketplace. It will have to clearly define what is
permissible subsidization and what is not. A subsidy provision in a trade
agreement or in any ensuing code will have to be fair, flexible, and co-
operative. Otherwise, it will lead to the utilization of subsidies that were
not in existence at the time of the negotiation of the agreement. To be
effective it must clearly bind the subnational governments, including mu-
nicipalities. It should specifically address and satisfactorily resolve the
Canadian phenomena of Crown corporations and Canadian concern with
its own cultural identity.
The establishment of an agreement on subsidization would create a
cooperative environment for new investment, in that many new major
investments have a net spill-over effect into nearby jurisdictions. Any
code should provide for greater discipline and create a forum for the
investigation and resolution of any alleged violations or prohibited prac-
tices and/or any behavior that exceeds permitted norms.
Canada is of the opinion that it is necessary to develop a framework
of rules governing a bilateral free trade arrangement, and to ensure that
these rules effect the substantive content of the agreement and provide
a comprehensive unified regime so as to interpret and to apply the agree-
ment. Such a framework should be exhaustive, and should not have to
resort to other domestic or multilateral procedures and remedies. More-
over, this framework needs an effective form of dispute resolution: a
process that should seek to enforce decisions through executionary mea-
sures rather than retaliation in order to ensure that the two countries
maintain an open trading regime. Other issues that need to be examined
in the negotiations include: whether such a dispute resolution framework
should exist at an inter-governmental level; whether it should permit direct
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access by the private sector; whether the decision by a national tribunal
should be enforceable at the domestic level or be binding at the inter-
national level between the two governments; and whether the framework
should be effected through a standing court, through ad hoc panels, or
through some combination of these options.
VI. Tariffs
Tariffs are still a very important factor in the Canada-United States
relationship and must be dealt with in any bilateral trade agreement. It is
commonly stated that 80% of the goods exported to the United States
from Canada in 1987 will be duty-free, 15% at less than 5%, and only 5%
with greater than a 15% tariff. To state unequivocally that tariffs will no
longer be a concern is a misapprehension, however. First, the statement
is misleading because it does not take into account those types or clas-
sifications of goods that are not being traded between the two countries
as a consequence of the remaining high tariffs. Second, in removing and
reducing tariffs under the GATT, the ones that remain are high and create
effective protection. For example, a natural resource may be classified at
a zero tariff level and a finished product incorporating it at a 3-4% tariff
level. The tariff, however, is actually on the value added and constitutes
a tariff of approximately 30%.
VII. Role of the Subnational Governments in the Negotiations
A. INVOLVEMENT OF THE SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
Subnational governments have an important role to play in the economic
development of their respective nations. With the increased role of the
subnational governments in both countries, it will be difficult for either
federal government to present a unified position to other nations and
almost impossible to bind themselves to any type of agreement or treaty
without their prenegotiated cohesive support. Consequently, if a bilateral
trade agreement is to endure and be meaningful, it must involve the sub-
national governments 9° throughout the negotiations. The important caveat
that must be kept in mind is that states are not directly equatable to
provinces. It will be necessary to bind the subnational governments to
the results of the negotiations if the two countries are to resolve their
trade problems effectively and expeditiously.
While tariff barriers have been reduced and substantially eliminated
over the last forty years, nontariff barriers have simultaneously increased
90. This is especially true in Canada, which does not have an equivalent to the interstate
commerce clause that allows Congress to regulate certain behavior of state governments.
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dramatically, particularly at the subnational level. This significant increase
in nontariff barriers has eroded the concessions obtained in the previous
multilateral rounds under the GATT. These barriers, usually in forms of
financial aid or support, often violate the GATT in spirit, though not in
its letter.
If a comprehensive trade agreement is to achieve the stated objectives
of both governments, it will have to deal extensively with nontariff bar-
riers. Provincial governments (in Canada) requested actual involvement
in a nontraditional format because a substantial portion of nontariff bar-
riers have their roots at the subnational level. Major nontariff barriers in
Canada are often solely within provincial jurisdiction or are shared with
the federal government. To complicate the negotiation of a bilateral trade
agreement further, the division of powers between the federal authorities
and the provinces/states is not identical in both countries. In theory this
can result in a specific nontariff barrier existing at the federal level in one
country and at the subnational level in the other. In endorsing the terms
of an agreement bearing upon nontariff barriers, the provinces and the
states will have more influence than they have had in trade negotiations
in the past, where their role has been limited to one of consultation.
How the provinces will bind themselves has constitutional implications.
The Honorable William Bennett, former Premier of British Columbia,
recently stated:
There would have to be a constitutional amendment binding the provinces to
the trade agreement. A formula has already been suggested, similar to the
flexible amending formula of our national constitution. There is no agreement
on exactly what it will be, but there should not be as much difficulty as there
is with the constitutional agreement. 9 1
This particular issue will continue to be a question of historic constitu-
tional importance for Canada. In a positive vein, a federal-provincial
compromise on a major constitutional issue of this nature could lead the
way to a new era of federal-provincial involvement and cooperation.
B. INTERPROVINCIAL BARRIERS
Canada is a confederation as opposed to a union of states. Canadian
provinces hold more power than their American counterparts. Canadians,
however, have not used their provincial structure in as assertive a manner
as the European countries have used the European Economic Community
or the United States has used the Congress to strengthen their internal
economy. Instead, interprovincial relations have often revolved around
disputes, as have federal-provincial relations.
91. Address by The Honorable William Bennett, Americas Society, New York (Nov. 20,
1986).
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The negotiations and any resulting agreement should, in part, focus on
domestic provincial policies, many of which are outdated and have not
been reviewed in several decades. These policies have become an ac-
cepted way of doing business and their purposes are not questioned. Those
policies that create interprovincial barriers and also barriers between Can-
ada and the United States should be examined to assess:
" the economic rationale for the policy;
" the political motivation for the policy;
* the gain in foreign markets that might stem from a revision of these
policies; and
" the potential losses as a result of keeping the status quo (for example,
Canadian access to the United States' market for liquor and beef is
more advantageous than the American access to Canada).
Many policies are no longer important economically, and the rationale
for the existence of others has disappeared. The policies often create
interprovincial trade barriers both within Canada and at the international
level. If a negotiated agreement is to work, interprovincial cooperation
will have to increase. 92 If Canadians can remove these barriers at the
interprovincial level, it will be a positive sign of a new cooperation in-
ternally within Canada that could develop into a positive resolution of
major interprovincial problems unrelated to Canada-United States issues.
VIII. Other Nontariff Trade Irritants93
Existing nontariff trade barriers facing manufacturers in the penetration
of each other's market are numerous and extensive both at the federal
and subnational levels. Trade practices that impede bilateral trading in-
clude, inter alia: import restrictions, export subsidies, customs barriers
(e.g., origin marketing on pipes and tubes), "Buy America" and "Buy
Canadian" laws and policies, government procurement, refusal of visas
for service personnel (which jeopardizes prospective export of machinery
and equipment from Canada to the United States), United States' trade
remedy laws, United States Defense Department expenditures on re-
search and development, restrictions on technology transfer, misuse of
trade remedy laws, unitary taxation in the United States, foreign invest-
ment controls in Canada, and small business set-asides in the United
States that effectively preclude Canadian entry into markets that are open
in Canada to Americans. This indirectly results in forcing Canadian
branches to open subsidiary plants in the United States.
92. "If this agreement is to go through, then there are going to be very significant changes
in the way the provinces do business with each other. Everybody in both the private sector
and Congress would agree on that." Address by Ambassador Peter Murphy, Americas
Society, New York (Nov. 20, 1986).
93. The nontariff irritants discussed here are not a comprehensive or complete review of
either existing barriers or of the barriers themselves.
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An example of an American nontariff barrier and the far reaching effect
of import restrictions is the Jones Act 94 with its impact upon not only
ship building, but also upon the lumber industry in both countries. Trans-
portation costs comprise an important factor in the cost of producing
lumber and delivering it to market. It amounts to a de facto total embargo
for export to the United States of vessels constructed by Canadian
manufacturers.
Restrictions creating nontariff barriers in both countries, such as the
Jones Act, should be examined in terms of their negative impact upon
other domestic industries in addition to their detrimental impact on foreign
trading relations.
IX. Impact of a Canada-United States Trade Agreement
A. A TRADE AGREEMENT AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CANADA
1. Foreign Investment in Canada
The Investment Canada Act (ICA), 9 5 which repealed the controversial
Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA), 96 reflects Canada's current pol-
icy of encouraging investment in Canada by both Canadians and non-
Canadians. The major focus of the new agency established by the ICA
has been to promote Canada as a favorable place to invest and to do
business. Business acquisitions completed under the ICA raise most of
the same issues as arose under FIRA. Under the ICA, however, the rules
and their application have been greatly simplified and the scope of the
legislation has been significantly reduced. Other major factors easing the
burden on foreign investors making business acquisitions under the ICA
include the greatly compressed review time required for reviewable cases,
the absence in most cases of any requirement for negotiated undertakings,
and the current track record of allowed transactions under the Mulroney
government (100%).
94. Merchant Marine (Jones) Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982). For register in the
United States the owner of the ship must be a United States citizen or, if a corporation,
the principal officer must be one and 75% of the issued stock must be owned by United
States citizens. The Jones Act provides, with certain exceptions, that only vessels of United
States' registry may be used in United States' territorial waters for commercial purposes
such as dredging, salvage, and carrying freight and passengers between points in the United
States.
95. Can. Stat. 1984-85, c.15.
96. Can. Stat. 1973-74, c.46, as amended by Can. Stat. 1976-77, c. 52, s. 128(2) and Can.
Stat. 1980-81-82, c.107, s. 63; repealed by Investment Canada Act, Can. Stat. 1984-85, c.15
(effective June 30, 1985).
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2. Foreign Investment Regulation
and the Impact of an Agreement
Upon Foreign Investment in Canada
Trade is only one aspect of the complex interdependent economic re-
lationship between Canada and the United States. Both countries are
significant investment partners to the other: Canada is the fourth largest
investor in the United States, 97 and the United States the largest investor
in Canada. 98 There is a correlation between trade and investment, al-
though it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure it quantitatively. Ap-
proximately two-thirds of the two-way trade between Canada and the
United States is estimated to be intrafirm, 99 arising out of American in-
vestment in Canada. Historically, Canada erected trade barriers through
high tariffs to achieve the economic goals of protecting existing domestic
producers and to encourage foreign ones to invest in and establish man-
ufacturing operations in Canada as opposed to exporting there. Two in-
vestment issues are raised in the negotiation of a trade enhancement
agreement. First, the impact of an agreement upon investment in Canada
must be analyzed. Second, United States' concern with foreign investment
controls and restrictions in Canada must be resolved.
Will a comprehensive trade agreement increase both domestic and for-
eign investment in Canada or cause it to decrease at either the domestic
or foreign level? Increased investment in Canada will depend upon the
security of access for Canadian manufacturers to the American market.
Unless access is secure, both Canadian and foreign manufacturers would
be prudent to locate in the United States rather than in Canada for the
purposes of penetrating the American market. Additionally, for the Amer-
ican manufacturer secure access to the American market will be required
before any expansion on a large scale is initiated in Canada for facilities
to serve other than the Canadian market. An example would be Michelin,
which invested in a manufacturing plant in Canada primarily to service
the American market. It was later subjected to a countervail suit in the
United States based upon alleged subsidies given to Michelin to locate in
Canada and in particular in Nova Scotia (an economically depressed area).
Increased interest in investing in Canada will exist if a large degree of
security of access to the American marketplace can be achieved for
Canadian-produced goods.
Security of access to the American market is the major negotiating
objective of Canada in any comprehensive trade agreement. Security of
97. Information from United States Department of Commerce.
98. STATISTICS CANADA (1985).
99. Address by Dr. Earl Fry, former Special Assistant United States Trade Represen-
tative, "Canadian Cultural Sovereignty: Myth or Reality," Windsor, Ontario (Nov. 6, 1986).
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access would remove an important concern for continued and new do-
mestic and foreign investment. Note that foreign investment would not
be merely American, as it is anticipated that investors and manufacturers
from other countries would establish operations in Canada, as opposed
to the United States, because of lower operating expenditures through
lower costs for employees, land acquisition, and energy. The broadest
bilateral trade package (which is what Prime Minister Mulroney has stated
he would be negotiating for) would give "national treatment" to Canadian-
produced goods in the United States. National treatment would give se-
curity of access to Canadians and foreign investors in Canada to the
American marketplace, ensuring increased investment in Canada.
A comprehensive trade agreement would have a significant effect not
only upon foreign and domestic investment in Canada, but also upon
investment flows from Canada into the United States. The issue has been
raised as to whether as many branch plants will be established, expanded,
and maintained in Canada once the tariffs are removed. The assumption
is that many subsidiaries of American corporations established operations
in Canada to get "behind" the tariff walls and they have maintained their
operations in Canada predominantly for that reason.
3. Assured Access to the Canadian Investment
Market for American Corporations
While Canada wants assured access to the American marketplace, the
United States wants assured access for investment in Canada. Blanket
ICAI ° ° restrictions on acquisitions and on investments in certain sectors
will have to be resolved to give the required security of investment to the
United States. It is not known how much investment was displaced from
Canada through the enactment of the FIRA.10
The ICA, while acknowledged as a substantial improvement over the
FIRA, is nonetheless perceived in Washington as: (i) an unreasonable
restriction on entry of American investment into Canada; and (ii) an un-
reasonable denial of national treatment to American-owned investments
in Canada. 102 The United States has seen Canada impose stringent blanket
controls through the FIRA and the National Energy Program. 103 Concern
exists that this might happen again in the future. Americans feel that the
ICA does not provide the security of access to the Canadian marketplace
100. Supra note 96.
101. Id.
102. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1986 REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS
57-59(1986).
103. Budget Speech by the Honorable Allan MacEachan, House of Commons (Oct. 28,
1980).
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by way of investment necessary for them to open their marketplace to
the Canadians in exchange.
B. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONCERNS (PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS)
One of the primary concerns for the United States in the trade nego-
tiations is in the area of protection granted to intellectual property rights
in Canada. Prime Minister Mulroney undertook at the Quebec summit to
"[cooperate] to protect intellectual property rights ... [from] abuses of
copyright and patent law." 10 4
The most noteworthy measure that has emerged to date from the Prime
Minister's undertaking is the introduction by the government of amend-
ments to existing Canadian patent legislation 10 5 that would, if adopted,
significantly alter the procedures for obtaining and maintaining a patent.
The amendments 10 6 are intended to bring Canada's patent legislation more
closely in line with international practices as a prelude to Canada's rati-
fication of the Patent Cooperation Treaty. 107 Canada signed that treaty in
1970 but has not yet ratified it.
Canada currently grants compulsory pharmaceutical licenses to do-
mestic manufacturers, allowing them, after a period of patent protection
of three or four years, to copy a patented drug and to market it.' 0 8 The
licensee, or "generic" drug manufacturer as it is referred to, pays to the
patent holder a royalty equal to 4% of its sales of the drug. International
pharmaceutical corporations, most of which are American, have com-
plained bitterly since the implementation of this legislation in 1969. They
maintain that compulsory licensing provides inadequate patent protection,
discourages research and development of new products, and has enabled
generic manufacturers to compete unfairly in export markets. The cost
to brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers is perhaps typified by the
Pfizer pharmaceutical company, which asserts that one-third of its total
sales in Canada will be lost next year because of compulsory licensing. 109
In contrast, a recent Canadian Royal Commission could find no evidence
that compulsory licensing had reduced the profits of multinational phar-
maceutical corporations. I 1 0
104. Supra note 52, at 14.
105. Patent Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.P-4, as amended.
106. Bill C-22, An Act to Amend the Patent Act, 2nd Session, 33rd Parliament, 35 Eliz-
abeth 11 (1986).
107. The Patent Corporation Treaty, June 19, 1970, United States-Canada, 28 U.S.T.
7645, T.I.A.S. No. 8733.
108. Id. § 41(4).
109. Address by Edmond T. Pratt, Chairman, Pfizer, Inc., Section of International Law
and Practice of the American Bar Association (Aug. 1I, 1986).
110. MINISTER OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 253 passim (1985).
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Canada's remedial legislation, which has yet to be enacted, will grant
patent protection for a period often years, unless a generic pharmaceutical
manufacturer applying for a compulsory license manufactures the fine
chemical ingredients for the drug in Canada, in which case exclusive
patent protection will exist for a period of seven years. I I I Canadian crit-
icism of the proposed amendments centers on both the anticipated sharp
increase in the cost to consumers of pharmaceuticals and on concern that
no net research and development will occur in Canada, despite promises
to the contrary by several pharmaceutical corporations. For their part,
the pharmaceutical corporations lament the fact that the new legislation
will not extend the same seventeen-year protection to pharmaceuticals
that is currently provided to other patented products in Canada. While
this remedial legislation is a step towards assuaging American criticism
over the perceived inadequacies of patent protection afforded by Canada
to intellectual property, it will probably not quell it absolutely.112
C. THE CANADIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY AND
THE AMERICAN COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
Will the search by Canadians for a national identity be the ultimate
stumbling block in a bilateral trade agreement? Cultural sovereignty in
Canada is less of a concern at the provincial level than at the federal
(especially in Quebec, which is somewhat shielded by the French lan-
guage). This reality may stem from the regional nature of the Canadian
character, which is more secure in its regionalism than it is in its Canadian
image of itself. In examining cultural sovereignty, the interests of the
communications industry must be analyzed in conjunction with Canada's
goals relating to its cultural heritage.
Clearly Canada has defined policies, programs, and goals in the cultural
area, and should be entitled to pursue those goals. Conversely, the United
States has its own defined policies, programs and goals, and should be
entitled to pursue those goals. The question arises as to what happens
II1. OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT, BILL C-22: AMENDMENTS TO THE PATENT ACT
RELATING TO THE COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PHARMACEUTICALS (1986) (unpublished
commentary).
112. As of August 1987 the status of this legislation remained unclear. More particularly,
the Liberal-dominated Senate in Canada was refusing to pass this legislation without major
amendments that were designed to substantially reduce the amount of time during which
protection was to be provided to drug manufacturers. The Progressive Conservative Gov-
ernment, with its majority in the House of Commons, was not prepared to accept this
reduced period of protection, and was attempting to secure passage of the original version
of the legislation without prompting a major constitutional crisis in which the unelected
Senate would have prevented legislation approved by the elected members of the House of
Commons from becoming law.
VOL. 22, NO. 2
CANADA-U.S. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 381
when the goals or policies of one nation infringe upon the sovereignty of
the other nation or its citizens.
Canadian government action in four aspects of the broadcasting area
is particularly relevant to our current discussion:
* deductibility of foreign advertising expenses;
* Program Substitution: Program substitution effectively results in the
elimination of United States' advertising commercials with the sub-
stitution of Canadian ones;
* The Telecommunications Programming Services Tax 113 imposes a
seven percent tax on revenue of Canadian cable corporations, a tax
which is then used to subsidize the development of Canadian pro-
gramming; and
9 Canadian Satellite Communications, Inc. relays United States' bor-
der programming by satellite to areas in Canada that are underser-
viced in terms of broadcast signals. The Canadian Radio-Television
and Telecommunications Commission has licensed Canadian Satellite
Communications, Inc. to relay United States' border broadcast sig-
nals by satellite to those geographic areas of Canada that are not
reached by two or more broadcast signals. This transmission or re-
transmission is without copyright compensation to the American
owner.
1. Deductibility of Advertising Expenses
In January 1976 the Income Tax Act of Canada1 14 was amended by Bill
C-58, which was enacted as section 19.1 of the Income Tax Act. The
amendment prevents the treatment of advertising expenditures as prop-
erly deductible business expenses by Canadian taxpayers if the advertising
is placed in a foreign periodical or on a foreign broadcasting station and
directed primarily at a Canadian audience. Expenses for advertisements
placed in the Canadian media are deductible. The purpose of the amend-
ment was to reflect the government's policy of encouraging more adver-
tising in Canada, thereby bringing Canadian advertising expenditures on
border stations in the United States back into Canada. The Government
believes that this would develop Canada's cultural identity by increasing
the amount of funds available for the production of Canadian programming
while improving its quality. 115 Simultaneously, this amendment decreased
revenues of American border broadcasters, effectively leaving them with-
113. Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.E-13, § 19.12, as amended.
114. R.S.C. 1970, c.1-63, as amended.
115. DONNER AND LAZER RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, AN EXAMINATION OF THE FINANCIAL
IMPACT OF CANADA'S 1976 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 19.1 OF THE INCOME TAX ACT (BILL
C-58) ON U.S. AND CANADIAN BROADCASTERS (1979).
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out compensation for programming received by Canadian audiences. This
provision of the Canadian Income Tax Act affected approximately $15 to
$20 million annually in advertising fees. 116 This estimate would appear
to have been somewhat conservative in light of a draft report to the
Department of Communications in 1983117 that estimated that the three
major American markets attracting Canadian advertising in 1982 had lost
about Can. $37.2 million relative to their potential for that year because
of the combined effects of Bill C-58 and simulcasting. 118
The United States, which alleged that Bill C-58 constitutes a violation
of international law, conducted an International Trade Commission in-
quiry into this matter and, as a result, enacted mirror legislation in 1984.119
It alleged that Bill C-58 did not afford American broadcast networks
"national treatment" because, firstly, it subjected them to less favorable
tax treatment than domestic Canadian programming received and, sec-
ondly, because it constituted an unreasonable restraint on international
trade. The mirror legislation denies a deduction from United States income
tax for advertising expenses incurred on foreign broadcast stations di-
rected to the American market. The legislation is operative only when
the foreign country denies deductions to advertising on American stations.
Effectively, the only country to which this legislation is applicable is
Canada; it would become inoperative upon the repeal of Bill C-58.
The express goal of Bill C-58 was to discourage advertising on American
broadcast stations while encouraging it on Canadian ones. Critics allege
that its result has been to make the cost of advertising on Canadian stations
artificially low as compared to the cost of advertising on American sta-
tions, because Canadians advertising on American stations are effectively
taxed at twice the rate as on Canadian stations.
2. Program Substitution (Simulcasting)
The Broadcasting Act Regulations 120 grant Canadian broadcast signals
preference over American ones (often referred to as simulcasting). Under
the substitution policy, when an identical program is carried by a cable
station on both a Canadian and an American network, the American
program may be replaced by the Canadian one at the request of the local
Canadian broadcaster. This is an attempt to support local Canadian broad-
casters and protect their local advertising base. The United States has
116. Id.
117. DONNER & KLIMAN, TELEVISION ADVERTISING AND THE INCOME TAX ACT: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF BILL C-58 (1983) (A draft report for the Department of
Communications).
118. Id.
119. Supra note 57, at 232.
120. Can. Cons. Regs. 1978, c.374, as amended by SOR/81-944.
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similar simulcasting provisions. 12 1 However, the United States' provi-
sions, which require that distant signals be blacked out to avoid program
duplication, applies equally to all distant signals both foreign and domes-
tic. In practice the Canadian provisions have been applied only to Amer-
ican signals.
In effect, the programming is identical, the only difference between the
Canadian and American broadcasts being commercial advertising. Si-
mulcasting prevents an American advertiser from reaching the Canadian
cable viewer market unless the advertising is run simultaneously on the
Canadian station at the expense of the American advertiser.
3. The Telecommunications Programming Services Tax
The Telecommunications Programming Services Tax 122 imposes a seven
percent tax on the revenues of Canadian cablevision companies. This tax
or levy is placed in a Canadian Broadcasting Development Fund, which
is used to develop Canadian programming.
The Fund has been criticized as encouraging the export of Canadian
programming through subsidization, especially when Canadian cable-
vision companies do not pay for the American programming they receive
from border broadcasters. Critics have alleged that the Fund constitutes
an export subsidy in violation of article XVI of the GATT by allowing
Canadian programming to enter into the international marketplace at an
artificially low cost.
4. CANCOM
In 1983 the Canadian Radio-Television Commission (CRTC) authorized
the Canadian Satellite Communications Inc. (CANCOM) to distribute
American network broadcast signals to remote and underserviced areas
of Canada by satellite to be used there by cable television and low power
television transmitter operators. The transmission is without authorization
by the American border broadcaster and without monetary compensation
to the American copyright holders of the program. This irritant is further
aggravated by the allocation of a percentage of Canadian profits to the
development of Canadian programming.
The international implications of signal piracy by CANCOM have cre-
ated a severe rift in the economic relations of Canada and the United
States. 12 3 Approximately 40-50% of the motion picture industry's rev-
121. 44 C.F.R. § 76.93(a) (1974).
122. Supra note 113.
123. See INTERNATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE, PIRACY OF U.S. SATELLITE PROGRAMMING
IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE (1986).
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enues come from foreign sales.1 24 Their largest customer is Canada. 125
In a world-wide study on intellectual property, the United States Copy-
right Office concluded that although Canada may not technically be vi-
olating international treaties that protect intellectual property, it is violating
them in spirit by not providing adequate and effective copyright protection
for American programming. 1
26
Canada has begun to address the question of retransmission. The Gov-
ernment of Canada acknowledged the problem in a White Paper and
requested further study of the issue. 127 This was followed by a parlia-
mentary report 128 and a government response. 129 The House of Commons
Committee on Copyright, in its 1985 report, and the government response
indicated an intention to amend Canadian law so as to create a retrans-
mission right for compensation to the author. However, the payment
system was left to be determined at a future date following study and
recommendation.
All four measures (Bill C-58, the requirement of simulcasting, the li-
censing of CANCOM, and the 7% tax), from the American viewpoint,
deny American owners equitable compensation for the use of their copy-
righted works. In addition, the measures can be viewed as detracting from
Canadian-American business and investment relations. Economic and cul-
tural imperatives, rather than foreign policy priorities, placed pressure on
Canadians to cease to invest in American border advertising.
The Canadian policies are embedded in the country's goal of preserving
and fostering its cultural identity as being separate and distinct from that
of the United States. This goal, standing by itself, is an acceptable national
policy and an acceptable norm at the international level. These policies
have, however, created a severe irritant, if not a rift, in Canadian-Amer-
ican relations by reason of their negative economic impact on the copy-
right and communications industries in the United States. National
sovereignty is a serious challenge facing the international business com-
munity. Piracy of goods, both tangible and intangible, distorts interna-
tional trade flows and investment. It is estimated that the CANCOM
measures implemented by Canada cost American copyright owners U.S.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Oversight on International Copyrights: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Pat-
ents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1183 (1984).
127. MINISTER OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, DEP'T OF COMMUNICATIONS, FROM GUTTEN-
BERG To TELIDON: A WHITE PAPER ON COPYRIGHT (1984).
128. MINISTER OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, A CHARTER OF RIGHTS FOR CREATORS (1985).
129. MINISTER OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE REPORT OF
THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE REVISION OF COPYRIGHT (1986).
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$25 to U.S. $100 million and that Bill C-58 deprives American firms of
U.S. $20 to U.S. $40 million in advertising revenues every year. 130 Im-
proved protection of intellectual property is of crucial importance to in-
ternational trading and investment.
Whether or not a comprehensive trade agreement is achieved in the
negotiations, a bilateral agreement setting substantive norms and mini-
mum standards relating to border broadcasting issues, coupled with both
countries' adhering to higher standards at the international treaty level,
would be a means to redress economic distortions caused by inadequate
protection in the international marketplace. Border broadcasting irritants,
unlike many international trade disputes or investment impediments, in-
volve a restriction on the entry of services as well as products into the
foreign marketplace. Additionally difficult is the inseparable meshing of
economic and cultural interests in border broadcasting. Although certain
policies may be desirable to achieve internal goals within Canada in fos-
tering its unique cultural heritage, they have been very costly to copyright
owners and broadcast interests south of the forty-ninth parallel.
D. TRADE IN SERVICES
The Quebec Declaration constituted a commitment to halt growing pro-
tectionism in cross-border trade in services. In the negotiations, the United
States is attaching priority to the negotiation of a framework of rules
relating to trade in services. 13 1 Ambassador Yeutter indicated that a sig-
nificant trade barrier existed in Canadian and provincial regulations that
impeded American export of services to Canada. 132 He reaffirmed that
this sector was to be an issue in the negotiations during his testimony
before the Senate Finance Committee in Spring of 1987. At that time he
identified the service sectors that the United States was interested in
negotiating as: transportation, informatics, communications, professional
services, and advertising.
As international competition increases between the developed trading
nations and the newly emerging ones, many sectors of exported goods
from the industrialized nations will become sunrise industries. Attention
must be focused on how the technical innovations of the last thirty years
have changed our trading patterns. Greater consideration must be given
to the conduct of international trade in services. In general, the service
industries tend to be regulated ones. With few exceptions, trade in services
130. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1986 REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS
53(1986).
131. Supra note 52.
132. Supra note 67.
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is not subject to international agreement. In the same way that trading
nations benefitted from liberalized trade in tangible goods during the post-
war years under the GATT, so would trading nations benefit from liber-
alized trade in services. An agreement relating to trade in services would
require changes in both countries' domestic policies, laws, rules, and
regulations. While regulation of particular industries and financial sectors
are important, regulation should not be used for protectionism. Regulation
should not be applied in a manner that creates a barrier to international
trade in services. In most instances, proper regulatory objectives can be
achieved in a nondiscriminatory manner.
Of particular significance is the strong interest of the United States in
having Canada's financial services sector liberalized and made more ac-
cessible to the American financial industry. There is a strong perception
in the United States of inequality in the manner in which each country
treats foreign financial service firms. The American financial industry
perceives that Canadians have much wider and more secure access to the
American market than Americans have to the Canadian.
Among the financial service issues that the American firms are inter-
ested in having negotiated and liberalized are:
* the prohibition against foreign firms' offering financial advisory ser-
vices to both individuals and institutions in Canada;
" the need for guaranteed access to telecommunications and informa-
tion networks and to electronic services delivery systems, both public
and private;
" current restrictions on the operations of foreign securities firms and
banks in Canada;
* restrictions on the ability of Canadian pension funds to invest outside
Canada;
" the lack of rules to ensure fair competition with services provided
by Canadian government-owned entities, and to ensure the provision
of services to the government and government-owned entities on an
equal basis; and
" differences in national regulatory structures that impose hardships
on firms of either country seeking to do business in the other. 133
In December 1986 the Government of Ontario announced new liber-
alized ownership rules for nonresident securities firms 134 carrying on busi-
ness in Ontario under the Securities Act. 135 As of June 30, 1987,
133. Address by Harry L. Freeman, Executive Vice-President, American Express Com-
pany, Americas Society, New York (Nov. 20, 1986).
134. The Honorable Monte Kwinter, Statement in the Legislature of Ontario, "Re: Entry
Into and Ownership of the Securities Industry" (Dec. 4, 1986).
135. Ont. Rev. Stat. 1980, c.466, as amended.
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nonresidents of Canada have been permitted under these rules to own up
to 50% of a securities firm in Ontario, and the limits on the degree of
nonresident ownership of securities firms in Ontario are scheduled to end
on June 30, 1988. On the other hand, the federal Minister of Finance in
Canada stated, in connection with a review of the ownership and powers
of federal financial institutions, that "[tihe government has reviewed ex-
isting laws regarding foreign ownership of federally regulated financial
institutions and concluded they should not be changed, subject to trade
negotiations currently underway." 136
A trade in service agreement between the two countries would require
national treatment of service firms. Ideally, they would be subject (whether
directly or through a subsidiary) to the same policies, laws, rules, and
regulations that are applied to domestic industry. Acceptable commercial
practices and private international laws that bear on services should be
supplemented by a set of rules that take into account the globalization of
financial markets. The globalization of capital markets has increased the
amount of offshore competition that the North American financial industry
has experienced. In order to compete effectively in the international
marketplace, the financial services sector and many other service indus-
tries cannot be hermetically sealed against the entry of foreign services
through discriminatory regulation. Regulatory barriers sustained in the
absence of industry support effectively become economic incentives to
go offshore, further eroding the regulatory framework.
The negotiation of such an agreement poses many conceptual problems,
but we should not be deterred by this. The prospect of being pioneers of
liberalized trade in this sector is an opportunity with respect to which
our nations must take the initiative.
E. THE ROLE OF COMPETITION LAW
IN A TRADE ENHANCEMENT AGREEMENT
1. Canadian Competition Law and Enforcement
Throughout its lengthy history, Canadian competition legislation has
been characterized by significant difficulties of enforcement. These prob-
lems have largely proceeded from constitutional limitations (relating to
the Canadian Federal Government's power to legislate and enforce leg-
islation), which has meant that, until quite recently (1976), the law being
applied has been exclusively criminal in nature. Canada's competition law
was substantially revised last year. 137
136. MINISTER OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
14 (Dec. 18, 1986).
137. On June 19, 1986, Bill C-91, amending the Combined Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970,
c.C-23, as amended, came into force and renamed it the Competition Act, R.S.C. 1986,
c.26.
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The enforcement problem in Canada has been particularly important
in relation to such matters as mergers and monopolies, which the Act
presently attempts to regulate on a criminal law basis. As evidence of
this, one need only mention that, to date, the Canadian Government has
yet to succeed in a contested merger prosecution and that its record in
relation to monopoly offenses is similarly unimpressive.
Other enforcement concerns involve efforts by the Canadian Govern-
ment to nullify the extraterritorial enforcement of foreign (i.e., United
States) competition laws in Canada, most recently exemplified by the
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act. 138 It would appear that the Ca-
nadian Government, in addition to clothing itself with the power to resist
the extraterritorial application of American competition laws by enacting
the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, has also taken steps to en-
courage a reduction in such extraterritoriality by entering into various
Memoranda of Understanding with the United States.
Subsection 32(4) of the old Act provided for an exemption, in certain
limited circumstances, from the conspiracy provisions, when the "con-
spiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement related only to the export
of products from Canada." Many Canadian firms and trade associations
consistently took the position that because the application of this ex-
empting provision was conditioned on, among other things, the agree-
ment's not having lessened competition unduly in the domestic market,
it was of limited practical utility. The new Act attempts to make the export
exemption more useful to Canadian firms that combine efforts in an at-
tempt to expand into foreign markets. The new Act replaces the old
limitation with a less stringent requirement that the agreement must not
have lessened competition unduly in the supply of services facilitating the
export of products from Canada. The new Act also permits parties to an
export agreement to reduce the volume of exports of certain products if
the real value of these products is not reduced, suggesting that product
quality may be upgraded as a trade-off for a reduction in unit export sales.
2. The Interaction of Competition and Trade Law
The interaction of domestic competition and international trade laws
and their impact upon international commerce are inextricably linked.
Competition law is generally intended to protect the population from any
negative impact of monopolies and conspiracies, while trade law protects
domestic industry from offshore competition. In theory, the world trading
system under the GATT is consistent with the philosophy of competition
law:
Competition policy is aimed at ensuring the efficient functioning of markets by
the removal of control of restrictive business practices. Trade liberalization
138. Can. Stat. 1984 c.49.
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policies focus on the removal of barriers to international trade through actions
to reduce tariff levels and through agreements to limit the effects of nontariff
measures. 1
39
A bilateral agreement reducing tariffs and, more importantly, nontariff
barriers is expected to "sharpen competition" in North America. 140 In
Canada, increased economic activity with the American market would
heighten competition, increasing the rationalization of industry and thereby
enhancing Canada's international competitiveness. 14
1
If a trade enhancement agreement is entered into by the two countries,
the high degree of economic integration that will result will create prob-
lems in the administration and enforcement of each country's domestic
competition laws. Guaranteed access to the American market for Canada
may undermine the basis of its traditional objections to the extraterritorial
application of United States' competition laws to Canada. Canadian and
United States' competition laws differ substantially and, when these dif-
ferences have an impact upon the behavior of corporations operating
within the four corners of an agreement, conflicts will arise unless pro-
vision is made in any resulting trade agreement for harmonization in
relation to transborder transactions. 142 Canada and the United States have
an opportunity as nations to be an example to the rest of the trading world
on how to be constructive in resolving the conflicts between their re-
spective trade and competition laws and having them function efficiently
at the international level.
F. THE IMPACT OF A BILATERAL AGREEMENT UPON THE GATT
Although the objective of the GATT is the liberalization of world trading
practices, it is not inconsistent to attempt to further this objective through
a bilateral agreement within the parameters of article XXIV of the GATT.
To enter into a bilateral trade enhancement agreement while continuing
to negotiate at the multilateral level is desirable for several reasons:
e Time: A bilateral trade agreement will have to be completed this year
before the authority under the fast-track procedure expires in January
1988. The multilateral negotiations will continue into the next decade.
139. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, COMPETITION &
TRADE POLICIES: THEIR INTERACTION I1 (1984).
140. MINISTER OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF IN-
VESTIGATION AND RESEARCH: COMPETITION ACT, 9-10 (1986).
141. Id.
142. Any attempt to amend Canadian competition law in order to ensure that there is
harmonization of competition policy would have to be handled with particular care. This is
because the new Competition Act has only been in force for a little over a year. As a result,
its administrators and boards subject to its jurisdiction are only just coming to terms with
this new idea. Amendments to this newly created statute have to be designed in such a way
as to ensure that it continues to evolve in as smooth a manner as possible.
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* Precedent: An opportunity to discuss, negotiate, and determine many
of the issues (which are also issues in the GATT round of negotiations)
would be a distinct advantage. Many of these issues have not been
part of the GATT in the past. To negotiate and resolve them at a
meaningful bilateral level would give greater credence to the United
States' and Canada's positions at the multilateral level.
* Bilateral Issues: Many of the issues on the table in the negotiations
are unique to the Canada-United States relationship, for example,
border broadcasting issues.
" Example: if Canada and the United States can negotiate successfully,
their behavior and the agreement itself will stand as a model for the
rest of the trading nations. 143
Through their unique relationship Canada and the United States have
an opportunity and a responsibility to be an example to the other trading
nations of the world in demonstrating how to expand and liberalize their
economic relations while achieving their domestic objectives.
X. Conclusion
While support in Canada for trade enhancement with the United States
was not originally overwhelming, the Macdonald Commission Report's
conclusion helped to increase public acceptance of the idea. Generally, there
has been support in Canada for the proposal, provided that: (i) programs
are developed to assist the adjustment process for certain key industries;
and (ii) any resulting agreement is phased in over a sufficiently long period
of time.
The Ontario Government remains to be convinced and has expressed
concern about its ability to stay competitive under a trade agreement.
The Canadian Minister of External Affairs, Joseph Clark, stated that
despite the Canadian Government's intent to involve the provinces, the
federal government will retain control of the negotiations, determine the
terms of an agreement, and retain full constitutional supremacy over in-
ternational trade. He stated that "the bottom line of what I mean is that
the responsibility for international trade is ours and we intend to exercise
that responsibility."' 144 Provincial ratification of certain sections of any
resulting agreement will be required, however, unless the federal govern-
ment expands its jurisdiction through a constitutional amendment.
Labor is strongly opposed, as are those concerned about Canadian
independence, identity, and culture, and they continue to voice concerns
143. Address by The Honorable Donald Macdonald, Canada and International Trade:
The Canada-United States Trade Negotiations Conference, Ottawa (May 8, 1986).
144. Interview with The Honorable Joseph Clark, The Financial Post (Feb. 21, 1986).
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over growing economic interdependence with the United States. 145 Such
interdependence would be difficult, if not impossible, for Canada to later
reverse, which has raised concern over the ability to attain national ob-
jectives. Many laws, regulations, and policies will ultimately need to be
harmonized between the two countries. Is this a price that Canada, as
the smaller of the pair, is willing to pay?
Canada has more to gain economically than the United States from a
comprehensive trade agreement: a market ten times larger than that to
which it currently has secure and open access. In return, the United States
will want substantial nontariff concessions by Canada. Sufficient justifi-
cation for the United States to give away a portion of its market to Canada
will have to exist if an agreement is to win the approval of Congress.
The minuses of a United States-Canada free trade arrangement are easy
to see and should not be allowed to cloud the issues. The pluses are more
diffuse. In Canada it could lead to improved products that are competitive
in the world marketplace, increased jobs, higher wages, and lower cost
of consumer goods. In the United States, it could lead to a more open
trading regime with other nations as they come to realize that an open
trade policy with the United States is necessary to avoid the stings of
American protectionism. Overall, the binational effects could be expected
to result in a more efficient North American industry with improved com-
petitiveness in the world marketplace.
The negotiation of a bilateral trade agreement has been involved, frus-
trating, time-consuming, and has required perseverance on the part of
both countries. Substantial impediments remain to be overcome before
we achieve an improved and expanded trade relationship between the
United States and Canada. Greater compromise and less rhetoric are
required before unrestricted and fair trade becomes a reality. One can
only hope that the foresight and compromise that produced the Auto Pact
will enable the current negotiators to overcome these impediments and
create solutions that benefit and strengthen the economies of both nations.
145. See THE OTHER MACDONALD REPORT (D. Drache & D. Cameron eds. 1985); THE
FREE TRADE PAPERS (D. Cameron ed. 1986).
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